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Abstract
In this article we lay emphasis on the main economic features related to the
development of unconventional gas seen as a highly sophisticated technology which
may contribute to address the needs of a world increasingly hungry for energy.
More particularly, the article aims at showing how the real options theory may
be a convenient tool to analyze the decision to invest in the shale gas production
by simultaneously taking into account the uncertainty, the irreversibility and the
negative externality on the environment.
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1 Introduction
In a complex and multipolar world, ensuring reliable access to su¢ cient quantities of
energy is more than ever a priority. The challenge we face today is to provide new
options for and solutions to one of the most important strategic issues, security of energy
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supply. Recent times have seen an increasingly complex environment for the energy
industry. As illustrated in Figure 1, the energy sector is characterized by heterogeneous
markets, regulatory risk and a number of di¤erent industrial strutures. It also involves
di¤erent players (including governments which must understand the hurdels for large scale
investments, and companies which must adapt to new technical changes), fragmented
regulatory regimes, various infrastructures and geologies with di¤erent skillsets, and also
distinct public perceptions.
Figure 1: Main drivers in energy eld
In this context, the issue of energy security must be studied within a multidisciplinary
framework where technical, economic and political aspects are treated together. This
explains why the economic theory is increasingly applied to the decision the decision-
making process in this eld. In a world where resources are limited (some much more than
others) and forcasts are very dicult, it is essential to make a selection and prioritization
of investement projects. In this sense, the application of economic principles is necessary,
as it helps to compare the benets of a project with the costs incurred to obtain them.
Altghough trivial, this approach faces important challenges like heterogeneous benets
and costs or di¤erent time horizons: some projects have known benets, but uncertain
costs, or vice versa. Investements in the energy sector provide an example of such tricky
features.
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Particularly, policy makers in the energy eld are faced with the task of balancing the
objectives of security of energy supply with those of cost minimization and environmental
preservation. All these objectives interact in the optimization problem of maximizing
social welfare through the use of various policies. Consequently, the ability to adjust
decision according to arrival of new information over time is essential. It is well known
that every public policy involves some uncertainty and involves some risk taking, both at
individual and at collective level. Faced with this inescapable fact, the policymaker is not
totally helpless, the economic calculation may be an instrument of decision support.
Many studies and discussions concerning the advantages and the disadvantages of
unconventional gas focus on the qualitative analysis of the issue, but few studies give
emphasis to a quantitative analysis from regulators point of view1. Thus, our paper
investigates the applicability of the real options theory to investments in energy sector,
with a main focus on the highly challenging issue of the developement of unconventional
gas. The objective here is to show how real options provide an adequate toolbox to answer
the following research question: how economic modeling may complement institutional
analysis to tackle the investment decision in a context characterized by uncertainty and
exibility?
The development of the unconventional gas industry in Europe is a problem that
indicates the limitations of existing regulatory instruments and the future challenges that
will face policy makers. This is a new industry which incorporates a familiar economic
theme: the exploitation of a natural resource. Given that this activity should take place
in habited areas, there is an important social aspect which must be taken into account.
Because the population is much richer than before and as a result tends to place more
value on the environment, she is not willing to sacrice the quality of life at any price. In
this case the regulator must choose between preserving this natural resource or starting
its use. The decision must take into account the presence of environmental externalities
and the social welfare of undertaking an investment in the exploration and the extraction
1Given the fact that the developpement of unconventional gas has characteristics of a public good like
the non-excludability and the non-rivalness, the appropriate context to study the problem is the policy
makers point of view.
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of this type of gas. The potential damage on the environment may be signicant and
most of all, irreversible. Generally it is not fully known before the developement of the
activity. If new information may become available over time, there may be a value to
wait rather than start a project with a stochastic outcome. The uncertainty regarding
the externalities may be reduced with the new information revealed over time. Therefore,
the question is of how much to invest and which is the optimal time to begin development
of the project. Under uncertain circumstances, the exibility to wait or to invest has an
option value which is a part of the projects total value and thus it must be evaluated.
The issue of controlling the uncertainty has given rise to a large and complex literature
in the economic eld. Many economists tried to tackle the problem of investment under
uncertainty in a distant future, by creating di¤erent economic models which made history
to this day. They tried to investigate how to represent the scientic uncertainty and
how to integrate this criterion in a decision dilemma2. Somehow they succeeded when
they developed the benet-cost analysis, which became over the time, one of the most
applied theories on investment decision. This technique of analyzing choices has some
characteristics and di¢ culties of economic ways of thinking that need to be reconsidered
for each particular situation. When the information is uncertain or cannot be quantied,
the benet-cost analysis rapidly shows its inconsistency. On the contrary, the real options
theory provides a more complete framework for project evaluation when uncertainty and
irreversibility are central to the decision problem. Generally, the traditional method
of Discounted Cash-Flows implies the evaluation of costs and benets over time of the
possible allocations in order to choose the one whose present value is highest. Even
so, this procedure presents shortcomings: it undervalues investments under uncertainty.
This traditional method cannot capture the exibility because it focuses only on two
components of value creation: discounted payo¤s and investment cost. The decision is
2The economic models of optimal extraction and the cost-benet analysis were generally used to
tackle the decision rule. For the rst type of models, the decision rule inuences the rate at which
exploitation should be undertaken given expectations about the demand, the price of commodity or the
cost of extraction. For the letter type of models, a project is developed if the net present value of benets
exceeds the net present value of costs.
4
static, taken once for all, without the possibility to change the future characteristics of a
project.
Since the 80s, real options theory is a modern approach used to better analyze strategic
decisions in domains with a high degree of uncertainty and a signicant dimension of
temporality: the natural resource exploration, the energy industry, the biodiversity, etc.
At least two reasons explain the success of real option theory. On the one hand, it
permits us to take into account the dynamic feature of innovation, and more generally,
the accumulation of information over time (scientic, geopolitical, ...). The discount rate
and distribution of future earnings are no longer the only central points of the evaluation.
On the other hand, the theory comes within the scope of the theories of decision and
basically helps us to answer the following question: what is the cost to be supported
today in order to preserve a wider exibility for a future decision?
The implication of uncertainty and irriversibility for projects involving potential en-
vironmental impacts was widely examined in the economic literature. Brennan and
Schwartz (1985) are the rst to create a general model to generate the appropriate time
to develop a project to extract natural resources. They include in the decision to change
the status of the project three types of real options: the option to wait, the option of
close and the option to reopen the mine. They show that precisely this option value of
changing between the various states should be included in the analysis. For example, they
demonstrate that a project should remain open until the point where the income plus the
value of the option to reopen will equal the value of variable costs. On the contrary, a
project is expected to remain closed until the point where revenue equals the variable
costs plus the option of closing. Fisher and Hanemann (1987) also study an investment
project concerning the development of an environmental resource. They consider that the
potential environmental costs are uncertain like other costs and returns. Pindyck (2000)
consider that there are two main uncertainties that must be treated in a project with
environmental implications: the uncertainty over the environmental evolution, i.e. eco-
logical uncertainty and the uncertainty over the future returns, i.e., economic uncertainty.
He concludes that an increase in the uncertainty of future costs and benets of a project
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aiming to reduce the negative impact on the environment, may lead to an increase in
the estimated threshold for adoption. More recently, Bretschger and Smulder (2006), Lin
et al. (2007) and Saltari and Travaglini (2011) rene these seminal works by taking into
account the ecological uncertainty, i.e. the inuence of the pollution seen as an externality
on the decision-making process.
We follow this recent strand of literature and we propose in the paper a simple model
which simultaneously includes the uncertainty, the irreversibility and the negative exter-
nality on the environment for an investment project of unconventional gas. We organize
the study into four sections including this introduction. In the second section, we explain
the main context of the shale gas developement and in the third section we present our
modelling framework. The last section concludes the paper.
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2 Unconventional gas: taking decisions under uncer-
tainty
The development of shale gas in the European Union is currently a subject of heated
debate where scientists and experts in the eld highlight the risks and the benets of the
exploitation of such deposits. Unconventional gas3 emerged as a promising solution for gas
production in Europe in 2008, after rapid development in the United States. Nowadays,
unconventional gas accounts for at least 25% of the American gas production4.
In a recent report by the European Commission (Pearson et al., 2012) the unconven-
tional gas is seen as a possibility to make it easier for the European Union to meet its
future energy needs. To date only two countries, the United Kingdom and Poland, have
clearly stated their willingness to produce on a large scale while countries such as France
continues to strongly oppose their development. It is clear that the debate concerns major
choices in energy and economic policies. More particularly, the shale gas production in
the European Union can be considered in terms of three main pillars of the energy policy,
namely the energy supply, the climate challenge and the competitiveness. Therefore, it is
necessary to outline some features and challenges.
It is rst in the name of energy security that countries like Poland intend to develop
their reserves of shale gas. The prospect of a signicant increase in gas consumption
(including a strategy of substitution of coal for electricity production5) and increasing
imports of natural gas brings to the forefront the issue of dependence on outside and
conditions of supply of natural gas. This question is central to the European Union since
3Unconventional gas is natural gas which is extracted using additional processes beyond the standard
drilling techniques. There are three categories of unconventional gas: shale gas, tight gas and coal-
bed methane (Pearson et. al., 2012). The new report from the IEA on the potential "golden age" for
gas (2011) mentions the discovery of signicant reserves of unconventional gas. This may change the
production and the energy supply in the future.
4United States possess more than one hundred years of consumption (60 Tm3 of unconventional gas
and 7Tm3 of conventional gas ), which is equivalent to the reserves of Russia.
5Poland holds the largest reserves of coal (lignite) in the EU. This energy represents today more than
90% of its electricity production.
7
its natural gas imports in 2030 are expected to represent 80% of its consumption. From
this point of view, the rst reports by the Commission tend to show that the development
of shale gas in the optimistic scenario would reduce its dependence on imports to 60% by
2040 (EU, 2013).6
In the case of countries like Poland, there is no doubt that its strong "dependence" on
Russian gas imports is an important factor of its gas developement strategy. Russia was
the only supplier of countries belonging to the CMEA and this situation has not changed
too much because of the infrastructure. Poland currently imports 10.9 billion m3 of which
9 billion m3 of gas from Russia. The reduced number of alternative suppliers, in the form
of LNG or pipelines (interconnectors with the Czech Republic and Germany, however,
allowed Poland to import signicant quantities of gas from spot markets) reect a lack
of infrastructure and connection of gas markets in the European Union. These aspects
clearly a¤ect the gas policy in Poland if we expect that its gas needs should increase in
the future, given that she must renew its electricity production (which is today mainly
provided by coal) in order to comply with its undertakings on climate change.
At the european level, the developement of shale gas can not be addressed without
considering the conditions of the gas supply in European Union, particularly its cost,
the diversication (or not) of suppliers, the terms of trade (type of contract versus spot
markets) and more generally, the political and economic stability of the producers7.These
factors a¤ect the competitiveness of two important "sources" of energy: imports of natural
gas (or LNG) and the production of shale gas. From this point of view, the protability
of shale gas should be considered especially in comparison with the level of import gas
prices. In this area the uncertainties are large and depend on the evolution of prices on
spot markets and for long-term contracts. In addition, the cost of production may also
6The optimistic scenario is that the EU increases its gas production by 1.5 times in 2040 compared
to current levels (IEA, 2013).
7Jansen et al. (2004) proposed a methodology to account for the safety of long-term supply through
some adjustments to the index of Shannon-Weiner. They take into account four factors, the diversity
of supply sources in the overall energy supply, the diversication of imports for each imported energy,
the political stability of long-term import regions and also considerations concerning the exhaustion of
energy resources of the countries from which come the sources of supply.
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be an essential variable for energy choices that are to be made. Although this cost varies
in di¤erent basins, it is less than 5$/MMBtu in United States (IEA, 2013). However, in
Europe the conditions of production may be signicantly di¤erent from those of the United
States and lead to assumptions of a signicantly higher cost. Consequently, signicant
economic, regulatory and institutional uncertainties remain and a¤ect the protability of
using this type of gas.
The rst main uncertainty is the importance of these reserves whose potential in
the European Union remains theoretical in the absence of further exploration. Di¤erent
evaluations have been made, but they should be treated with caution, some of them being
contradictory. Some european countries, like France and Poland seem to have signicant
rserves even if they remain highly uncertain (see Table 1).
Source EIA, Gm3 Autres évaluations, Gm3
Allemagne 220 0,7-2268
Danemark 650
France 5300
Lituanie 110 60-90
Norvège 2350
Pays Bas 480 70-400
Pologne 5290 350-1900
Royaume Uni 570 150
Suède 180
Turquie 130
Ukraine 110
Autres 160
Table 1: Estimated resources of technically recoverable shale gas in Europe (2009)
Sources : EIA (2011)
Moreover, the conditions for the development of these reserves are subject to various
constraints. These constraints mainly concern a lack of an adequate regulatory frame-
work and infrastructure (the realization of a single market for natural gas is still a goal
not achieved) or special conditions of access to resources (public property against private
property in the United States). Also, the issue of taxation and governmental incentives
that need to be implemented for development remains an untreated problem of primary
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importance. To these uncertainties one can add the uncertain potential impact on the
energy mix, on energy prices or changes in the political and legal environment. Signicant
uncertainties also refer to the evolution of energy demand, to the cost of producing uncon-
ventional gas (the technological progress is uncertain), to the strategies of conventional
gas exporters, to changes in the cost of transport (we know that the unconventional gas
is interesting if it is located close to markets, but there may be a problem with carrying
it over long distances).
The last part of the equation is the climate constraint and wider environmental impacts
which are not negligible. For instance, the extraction of this type of gas requires large
amounts of energy and water (15000 m3 of water per well drilled). Also, the massive use of
chemicals increases the risk of groundwater contamination. Related to these type of risks,
the fact that population density is much higher in Europe than in the United States makes
some concerns more actives (the extraction places are often close to residential areas). In
this context, for european countries remains a major choice to be made between developing
shale gas or import natural gas. However, given that we live in a world increasingly
thirsty for energy and where signicant technological advances are expected in the eld
of exploration and production, it is unlikely that unconventional hydrocarbons will be
abandoned altogether. Even if unconventional gas is more expensive to produce than
conventional gas, it has two major advantages: it may be an alternative energy to the
polluting coal and it helps to reduce the energy dependence of some countries.
Hence, it is easy to understand why the interplay between these uncertainties and
the nancial and environemental irreversibilities8 has an important role in the political
choices that are to be made. Likewise, the policy-makers in the eld of unconventional
gas must learn to manage these constraints and to adapt to them. For instance, when
new information arrive over time, the policy maker has the exibility to use it and thus to
8The investment in the exploration of unconventional gas is a highly specic task that requires an
enormous amount of technical and nancial resources. This kind of project involves large sunk investments
costs and thus, a strong degree of nancial irreversibility. Moreover, some of the environmental damage
resulting from unconventional gas production may also be irreversible. It will be some time before enough
data has been collected to understand the risk associated with unconventional gas production.
10
choose the optimal time and amount of development. Therefore, in the following model
we question about when (if ever) is optimal to invest in the shale gas development which
comes with potential environmental consequences, and how much (if any) investment
should be used.
3 The model
We propose to focus in this model on the uncertainty of environmental costs, which are
seen like a negative externality. This externality must be incorporated on the decision-
making function.
Let us consider an undeveloped reserve of unconventional gas which is analyzed by
a social planner. If the reserve is not developed, it may have a value derived from the
preservation of the local ecosystem. If the reserve is developed there may be an eco-
nomic value for its use because it can supplement the overall supply of energy. But the
use of this reserve entails important costs for the infrastructure and the exploitation as
well as unknown environmental costs. In order to construct an exhaustive evaluation of
this alternative, the latter type of costs must be taken into account. We state that this
costs (environmenal externalities) are stochastic, given that future information regarding
is revealed with the passage of time. The social planners knowledge about the environ-
mental externalities changes continuously. The following di¤usion process describes their
evolution over time:
dmt = (+ I)mtdt+ mtdw; for t >  (1)
The evolution of this costs depends on the amount of investement only from the
starting time of the development,  : The new information concerning changes in the envi-
ronmental impact is subject to the white nose process, dw:The drift and the instantaneous
standard deviation of the process are represented here by  and :
Before the investment begins, the social planner waits for new information which may
change the expectation that environmental impacts are too costly to justify the use of
the reserve. In this period, the environmental cost depends only on the current known
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impact and the stochastic change:
dmt = mtdt+ mtdw; for t   (2)
In the following, we are interested to nd the optimal level for the environmental cost,
m for which the level and the timing of the investment in the shale gas processing facility.
The value of the reserve developement is given by the private net outcome (return) less
the environmental externality stemming from the deployment of the resource. We assume
that these impacts on the environment begin when the project is started and continue
indenitely:
V (mt) = max
;I
Et(v(I)e
 r| {z }
net private return
 
1Z

mse
 srds)
| {z }
environmental cost
(3)
where v(I) is the net present value of the private return, I is the level of investment,
r is the dicount rate, ms is the incremental externality on the environment in the period
s,  is the starting time for developement.
In order to nd V (mt) we rst calculate the level of environmental impact for which
the social planner will undertake the development of the gas reserve.
The decision to develop the shale gas reserve may be analyzed within an optimal stop-
ping problem where  is the optimal stopping time and m is the boundary between the
stopping and the continuation regions. The uncertain variable mt will determine the opti-
mal solution: during the continuation region the decision-maker waits until the expected
environmental costs fall to a su¢ cient low level in order to start the developement. If
mt < m there is no reason to wait to invest because the environmental would be low
enough to induce the planner to invest immediately. In contrast, if mt > mand there is
expectation that it will fall, then it may be interesting to consider waiting for the optimal
timing of the investment.
The expected value of environemental costs is given by the second term from equation
(3), E
1R

mse
 srds:In the stopping region s   , the environmental cost evolves accordingly
the process stated in equation (1).
After appropriate derivations (Appendix 1), the expected value of environemental
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impacts is given by the following expression:
E(
1Z

mse
 srds j  ; I;m ) =
1Z

e srE(ms j  ; I;m )ds (4)
= e r (
m
r     I  
m
r   ) = e
 rf(m ; I)
with f(m ; I) =
Im
(r   )(r     I)
The optimal threshold may be found by solving the problem from the continuation
region, before the investment is started. Let us note with F (m ) the value of the project
at the boundary:
F (m ) = v(I
)  f(m ; I) = v(I)  I
m
(r   )(r     I) (5)
where I is the optimal investment.
Then, the maximization can be rewritten in order to nd the solution of the problem
in the stopping region :
max

E

e r (v(I)  f(m ; I))

(6)
for dmt = mtdt+ mtdw; t  
In the continuation region, the optimization principle of Bellman yields:
rV   1
2
2m2tV
00   mtV 0 = 0 (7)
with the additional conditions which must hold at the boundary:
V (m ; I
) = F (m ; I);mt  m (8)
where F represents the value of the project after the developement and V is the value
of the opportunity to develop. The equation (8) states that the value of the developed
project is at least as large as the value of waiting for more information as long as the
environmental impact is smaller than the threshold, m .
dV (m ; I
)
dm
=
dF (m ; I
)
dm
;mt  m (9)
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If the level of environmental costs rises without bound, the evolution of mt is expected
to remain so high that there is no value for the opportunity to develop. Thus, the rst
limiting condition is described by equation (10):
lim
mt!1
V (mt; I) = 0 (10)
Given that for the critical value m the decision-maker is indi¤erent between develop-
ment and no development, the second limiting condition states the equality between the
value of the opportunity, V and the actual value of the development:
lim
mt!0
V (mt; I) = v(I) (11)
The value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions allow us to obtain the optimal
environmental costs.
Proposition 1 The optimal level of environmental costs for which the development may
be undertaken is given by the following relation:
m =

   1(r   )(r     I
)
v(I)
I
;with  < 0 (12)
Proof. See Appendix 2
Proposition 1 shows that the threshold value of environmental costs depend on the
optimal level of investment, i.e. I and on the uncertainty which is captured here by the
parameter  describing the stochastic process. That is the value which determines the
optimal solution and the optimal timing.
Knowing the threshold for the environmental costs we are interested to nd the opti-
mal investment level. By substituting equation (4) into the maximization function from
equation (3), V (mt) becomes a function of investment, of the stopping time, and of the en-
vironmental cost when the investment is made. The solution will be given by the following
program, with r >  :
I = argmaxE

e r (v(I)  f( ;m ; I))

(13)
dmt = mtdt+ mtdw; for t   ; r > 
Moreover, the optimal investment is found by dixoerentiating the maximization program
(13) with respect to I and then equate to zero.
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Proposition 2 The optimal level of investment is given by the following relation:
v
0
(I) =
m
(r     I)2  0 (14)
with r    > I and m  0
Proof. See Appendix 3
By substituting the Equation (13) into equation (14), the optimal investment may be
written as follows:
v
0
(I) =
(r   )v(I)
(   1) I(r     I) > 0 (15)
We observe that the socially optimal size of investment is smaller than the amount
that a private rm would consider, Ip = v
0
(0) : This is explained by the fact that generally
the latter does not take into account the environmental externality.
If we di¤erentiate equation (13) with respect to I , we can study the relationship
between the optimal accepted level of environmental costs ans the level of investement as
following:
Proposition 3 The waiting period increases with the level of optimal investment, as
follows:
dm
dI
=
(r   )2v(I)
(   1)2 (I)2 < 0 (16)
Proof. See Appendix 4
The third proposition shows that the decision-maker will wait for a lower value of
environmental cost before undertaking a higher level of investement. This implies that
any level of investement larger than optimal, for instance the private optimum, creates a
larger increment on dm and requires a lower level for m :
The inuence of the social time preferences on the optimal time of investement may
be analyzed by di¤erentiating m with respect to r :
Proposition 4 An increase in the discount rate increases the threshold value for the
environmental cost; for a higher discount rate the opportunity cost of waiting is low and
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the decision-maker is more willing to invest:
dm
dr
=

   1
v(I)
(I)2
[(r     I) + (r   )] > 0 (17)
Proof. See Appendix 5
If the future is less important for the society, then a greater amount of environmental
costs is tolerated and a smaller amount of discounted future returns is required from the
investment. If the society pays a small attention to the future environment, involving
the use of a higher discount rate, there is a grater expected cost for the environmental
externality.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we showed how the economic theory can incorporate the uncertainties, the
irreversibility and the managing felxibility which may be available in the developement of
unconventional gas. Although we didnt aim to provide a complete model of the problem,
our intention here was to highlight some potential paths of how the real options theory
can be used to evaluate investments in this eld.
Our results illustrate that if the environmental costs are uncertain and if the social
planner is able to defer the starting time of an investment, then it is optimal to wait until
an optimal level of costs related to environmental externalities before investing. The value
of new information adds an economic value to the opportunity to delay the developement
of the gas reserve to a future date, until the environmental cost associated decreases.
Moreover, because the government adds the externality to its objective function, we nd
that the private optimal level of investment is higher than the socially optimal threshold.
Clearly, the resource is worth less to society because the latter incurs the cost of the
externality.
These results outline that the standard prescriptions from real options values hold
when the decision variable, i.e. the environmental impact, inuences the stochastic
process. They also show that the traditional analysis of benets and costs may demon-
strate important gaps when the uncertainty and the irreversibility are simultaneously
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considered. Hence, it is better to follow a gradual exploration process and to keep the
investment options opened, in order to clearly understand the uncertainty and the poten-
tial upside. Also, learning the processes can be a key to focus on core areas and reduce
unit cost and negative externalities.
APPENDIX
1.Solution to Equation (4)
First, expectations are taken of both sides of Equation (1):
dmt = (+ I)mtdt+ mtdw; fort > 
E [dmt] = dE [mt] = (+ I)E [mt]
This di¤erential equation has the following sollution:
E [mt] = mte
(+I)t
which, for the time t =  ;when mt = m ; becomes:
E [m ] = me
(+I)(t )
After integrating both sides from  to 1; we obtain the following environmental cost
after and before the development:
E(
1Z

mse
 srds j  ; I;m ) = m
r     I e
 r
and E [mt j I = 0] = m
r   e
 r
Finally, this gives the following relation for the environmental costs:
E(
1Z

mse
 srds j  ; I;m ) =
1Z

e srE(ms j  ; I;m )ds (A.1)
= e r (
m
r     I  
m
r   ) = e
 rf(m ; I)
with f(m ; I) =
Im
(r   )(r     I)
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2. Proof of Equation (12)
Using the smooth-pasting and the limiting conditions,
dF (m ; I
)
dm
=
dV (m ; I
)
dm
=
I
(r   )(r     I)
V 0(mt) =
@F (I;mt)
@mt
; for mt  m
 rV + mt @V
@mt
 0; for mt  m
V > F; for mt > m
rV (mt)dt = E [dV (mt)] (A.2)
We apply Itôs lemma for the last equation and we obtain the following di¤erential
equation, which is satised by the option value, is derived from Bellman principle:
rV   1
2
2m2tV
00   mtV 0 = 0 (18)
As long as environmental costs exceed some critical level, it is more protable to wait,
maintaining the opportunity to invest, V9.
In the continuation region the solution has the following form:
V = Amt +Bm

t
with the following expressions for parameters  and  :
 =
 
1
2
2   +q(  1
2
2)2 + 22r
2
 =
 
1
2
2    q(  1
2
2)2 + 22r
2
9See Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for a detailed description.
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where  > 1 and  < 0 are the solutions of the quadratic equation:
1
2
2(   1) +    r = 0 (A.4)
Because mt starts at a higher level and it is expected to decrease, the nal solution is:
V (mt) = Bm

t ;  < 0
and for mt = m
V (m ) = Bm

 ;  < 0
Thus, we obtain:
Bm = v(I
)  I
m
(r   )(r     I)
Bm 1 =  
I
(r   )(r     I)


v(I)  I
m
(r   )(r     I)

m 1
m
==   I

(r   )(r     I)


v(I)  I
m
(r   )(r     I)

m 1 ==  
I
(r   )(r     I)

v(I)
m
   I

(r   )(r     I) =  
I
(r   )(r     I)

v(I)
m
= (   1) I

(r   )(r     I)
m =

   1(r   )(r     I
)
v(I)
I
3. Proof of Equation (14)
By di¤erentiating Equation (12) with respect to I, we obtain:
dV
dI
= v
0
(I)  m
(r     I)2
which implies that
v
0
(I) =
m
(r     I)2  0
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Using the Equation (12) the rst order condition for the optimal investment can be
rewritten as follows:
v
0
(I) =

   1(r   )(r     I
)
v(I)
I
1
(r     I)2
v
0
(I) =

   1(r   )
v(I)
I
1
(r     I)
v
0
(I) =
(r   )v(I)
(   1) I(r     I) > 0
4. Proof of Equation (16)
dm
dI
=

   1(r   )

 v(I
)
I
+ (r     I)v
0
(I)I   v(I)
(I)2

dm
dI
=

   1(r   )
"
 v(I
)
I
+ (r     I)
( (r )v(I
)
( 1)I(r  I))I
   v(I)
(I)2
#
dm
dI
=

   1(r   )
"
 v(I
)
I
+ (r     I)
( (r )v(I
)
( 1)(r  I))  v(I)
(I)2
#
dm
dI
=

   1(r   )

 v(I
)
I
+ (r     I) (r   )v(I
)
(   1) (r     I) (I)2   (r     I
)
v(I)
(I)2

dm
dI
=
(r   )2v(I)
(   1)2 (I)2
5. Proof of Equation (17)
dm
dr
=

   1
v(I)
(I)2
(r   )(r     I)
dm
dr
=

   1
v(I)
(I)2
h
(r   )0(r     I) + (r   )(r     I)0
i
dm
dr
=

   1
v(I)
(I)2
24(r     I)| {z }
>0
+ (r   )| {z }
>0
35 =) dm
dr
> 0
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